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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are one of 25 million working women, or
suppose that you are a husband and father who depends on your wife’s
weekly paycheck to help provide basic support for your family. 1 You,
or your wife, are pregnant, and in addition to the menace of medical
bills, your livelihood is further threatened because the new mother will
have to take time off work in order to recover from her pregnancy. The
compensation package at your, or your wife’s, place of work includes
comprehensive non-occupational disability benefits, extending to
disabilities such as venereal disease, athletic injuries, and even hair
transplants, but the plan specifically excludes coverage for pregnancy
and pregnancy-related medical conditions. 2
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Bachelor of Arts, May 2004, College of Saint Benedict.
1
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT, 1978, at 3 (Comm. Print 1980)
(noting that 25 million women working in 1978 to provide basic support for their
families).
2
Legislative History of the PDA, at 2. G.E.’s program provided an employee
who became disabled as a result of an eligible non-occupational injury or illness to
receive 60% of his or her salary for a maximum of 26 weeks. Id. at 1.
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In 1976, the female employees of General Electric (“G.E.”)
faced precisely this situation. 3 Forty-three of the then-current and
former female G.E. employees banded together to challenge G.E.’s
benefits program. 4 Alleging that G. E.’s exclusion of pregnancy from
an otherwise comprehensive list of covered non-occupational
disabilities violated Title VII of the U.S. Code, these women argued
their case all the way to the Supreme Court—and lost. 5
Utilizing the definition of discrimination developed in its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, 6 the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that G.E.’s failure to provide disability
benefits for pregnancy related work absences did not discriminate on
the basis of sex. 7 Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert by amending Title VII, explicitly
providing, “the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”
3

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 129-130 (1976), overruled by
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
4
Legislative History of the PDA at 4.
5
Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 138. The judge of the District Court of the Eastern
District of Virginia and of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
female employees, holding that G.E.’s exclusion of pregnancy from its disability
benefits plan constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Gilbert v. Gen.
Elec. Co, 375 F. Supp. 367, 386 (E.D. Va. 1974), overruled by Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), overruled by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005); Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir.
1975), overruled by Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), overruled by
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005). The Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions overruled the
holdings of 24 lower Federal courts. Legislative History of the PDA at 7. In addition,
the Supreme Court refused to accord the force of law to EEOC Guidelines stating,
“Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. (Benefits)
shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and
conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.” Gen. Elec. 429 U.S. at
140-41 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
6
Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 133.
7
Id. at 145-46.
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include . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.” 8 Predictably, medical advances and
technological innovation have forced courts to apply Title VII in a
host of circumstances unconsidered by the express language of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and its legislative history. Causes of
Action examined as potentially cognizable include claims related to
maternal leave to accommodate breastfeeding, 9 insurance coverage of
contraceptives, 10 and adverse employment action due to an
employee’s decision to have an abortion. 11
Recently, the Seventh Circuit became the first Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals to recognize a cognizable Title VII claim where a
woman alleged an adverse employment action taken in response to her
pursuit of in vitro fertilization, a type of infertility treatment. 12 In so
doing, the Seventh Circuit created a possible conflict with the Eighth
and Second Circuits, which have both refused to recognize a
cognizable Title VII claim where an employer excludes infertility
treatments from insurance benefits plans. 13 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning creates a murky distinction between child bearing
capacity and fertility—although discrimination based on child bearing
capacity violates Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, discrimination based on fertility does not. 14
8

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
See e.g. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988); McNill v. N.Y.C.
Dept. of Corrections, 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc.,
49 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wallace v. Pyro Min. Co., 789 F.Supp. 867
(W.D. Ky. 1990).
10
See e.g. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp. Prac. Lit., 479 F. 3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007);
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 1266 (W.D. Wash., 2001); Stocking v.
AT&T Corp., 436 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D. Mo., 2006), reconsidered and vacated,
2007 WL 3071825 (W.D.Mo. 2007).
11
See e,g, Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008);
Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
12
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
13
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa, 95
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996)
14
Hall, 534 F.3d at 647-648.
9
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Despite the possible conflict and the obscure distinction, the Seventh
Circuit correctly determined that adverse employment action based on
an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments is gender discrimination
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit correctly recognized its decision as distinguishable from those
of the Second and Eighth Circuits.
II. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: GESTATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS PROTECTION
A. Title VII and the PDA
The history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 15 begins
fourteen years before its birth, with the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The relevant portion of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 16
A sex discrimination claim may arise under Title VII when an
employer perpetrates an adverse employment action due to an
employee’s gender. In other words, an employer violates Title VII if it
makes hiring, firing, or promotional decisions based on an employee’s
gender. 17 However, Title VII also prohibits gender discrimination in
15

Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005).
17
Id. See e.g. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 580
(1985)(affirming District Court’s finding of gender discrimination where petitioner
was denied position in favor of male applicant with qualifications inferior to
petitioner’s and where selection committee demonstrated gender bias); Sparks v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1154, 1562-1566 (11th Cir. 1987)(denying
16
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the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation,
benefits, job assignments, and transfers. 18 In addition, a Title VII
claim may proceed under either a disparate treatment or disparate
impact theory. 19 Overt or intentional conduct that treats an employee
in a manner which would be different but for the employee’s gender
represents disparate treatment discrimination. 20 In contrast, a facially
neutral employment practice which is applied even-handedly to all
employees but which, nonetheless, disproportionately impacts one
gender violates Title VII under the disparate impact theory. 21
The legislative history of Title VII, so expansive with regard to
the matter of race and color, is nearly mute with respect to the
meaning of the term sex and the extent of protection thereby
provided. 22 Virginia Congressman Howard Smith, a staunch opponent
of civil rights legislation, proposed amending Title VII to include the
term “sex” late in the Congressional deliberations, just two days

summary judgment on gender discrimination claim where employee was fired after
refusing manager’s sexual advances and where male employee retained position).
18
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) . See e.g. Ariz. Governing Committee for Tax
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 462 U.S. 1073, 1074
(1983)(holding that a retirement benefits plan which paid lower monthly benefits to
woman than to men who made the same contributions constituted sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII); City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power, 435 U.S.
702, 711 (1978)(holding that sex discrimination occurs where women are required to
pay greater pension contributions than men due to females’ greater life expectancy)
19
Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981)(defining the elements of the prima facie Title VII disparate treatment claim);
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982)(finding a violation of Title VII where
employer administered examination had a disparate impact on black employees)
20
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (indicating that burden of proving intentional
discrimination remains with plaintiff).
21
See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (noting that to establish a prima facie case of Title
VII disparate impact, plaintiff must demonstrate “the facially neutral employment
practice had a significantly discriminatory impact.”)
22
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp.2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
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before the final vote.23 Congress adopted the amendment after a mere
two hours of floor debate. 24
The Supreme Court attempted to interpret Congress’
prohibition of discrimination “because of…sex,” in General Electric v.
Gilbert. 25 According to the Supreme Court, the female G.E.
employees failed to demonstrate a gender-based effect resulting from
the exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities from coverage. 26 Rather
than representing an example of facial or pre-textual gender
discrimination, the G.E. plan, in the Supreme Court’s view, was
“nothing more than an insurance package, which covers some risks,
but excludes others.” 27 Since the male and female employees of G.E.
received the exact same package covering the exact same categories of
risk, the Supreme Court classified the benefits plan as facially

23

Commentators speculate that the term was added in an attempt to derail
passage of the Civil Right Act by adding a controversial category to the list of
protected classes. Id. But see Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent
Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1990-1991) (arguing
that the sudden addition of “sex” to the protections of Title VII is better understood
as an instance of persistent opportunism forcing major public policy innovation). In
support of her theory, Ms. Freeman notes several important factors which argue
against the addition of “sex” as a ploy to strike down the Civil Rights Act:
1)The potential beneficiaries of the amendment—women—
had experienced lobbyists on the Hill and were not
uninterested in the bill; 2) most Southerners had conceded
defeat and gone home by Wednesday; the vote occurred on a
Saturday, which is not Members’ favorite day to be in
Washington; 3) the number of Members voting on the
amendment—301—was larger than any other counted vote
that day (the others ranged from 178 to 240); 4) other
amendments which might “clutter up” the bill, including “sex”
amendments to other titles, were voted down.
Id. at 164-65.
24
Freeman, supra note 23, at 163.
25
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), overruled by Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
26
Id. at 137.
27
Id. at 138.
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neutral. 28 The Supreme Court also failed to detect any discriminatory
effect. In the court’s reasoning, G.E.’s failure to provide pregnancyrelated benefits did not change the parity of the benefits offered to men
and women. 29 Pregnancy-related illness and disabilities simply
exemplified an “additional risk, unique to women,” that exceeded the
benefits offered by the plan. 30
However brief its original consideration of the term, following
the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric, Congress amended
Title VII to include the following definition of sex discrimination:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
by similar in their ability or inability to work, and
nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise.31
Now known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), this
amendment to Title VII did not create any new rights or remedies. 32
Rather, the PDA is a rejection of the Supreme Court’s holding and
reasoning in General Electric. 33 Through the PDA, Congress
expressly provided that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is per
se sex discrimination and a violation of Title VII. 34
28

Id.
Id, at 139.
30
Id.
31
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
32
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2008)(citing Newport News
Shipping & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.. 669, 678-679 (1983)).
33
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 670.
34
See Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative
History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 126 (Comm. Print 1980)
(stating that “since only the female sex can bear children, any attempt to single out
29
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B. Supreme Court Interpretation of the PDA
Since the amendment of Title VII by the PDA, the Supreme
Court has had several occasions to consider the breadth and
application of the PDA. Through Newport News v. EEOC and
International Union v. Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court began to
create an analytical and precedential framework to guide the
interpretation and application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
In Newport News v. EEOC, the Supreme Court recognized the
PDA as a rejection of the Court’s reasoning and holding in General
Electric. 35 Newport News, like General Electric, considered
employees’ allegations of gender discrimination in the provision of
employment benefits. 36 In Newport News, the Supreme Court
determined that the health insurance plan at issue violated Title VII by
providing more comprehensive health care benefits to female
employees than to male employees. 37 Following the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Newport News Shipping had revised
its health care plan to cover pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions of its female employees. 38 The company did not, however,
extend pregnancy benefits to the female spouses of its male
employees. 39
The Supreme Court first noted that Title VII protects male as
well as female employees from gender discrimination.40 Next, the
and discriminate against the condition of pregnancy is an inherent attempt to single
out and discriminate against women.”).
35
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 670.
36
Id. at 671.
37
Id. at 676.
38
Id. at 671-72.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 682. The Supreme Court found no merit in the Petitioner, Newport
News’s, argument that Congress intended to limit the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act’s application to pregnant employees and that Newport News had no statutory
obligation to provide pregnancy benefits to the wives of its employees. The Supreme
Court reasoned that Congress’s focus on female workers did not “create a ‘negative
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Supreme Court reasoned that Newport News had gifted its female
employees with more favorable terms of employment than its male
employees. 41 Like the male employees in General Electric, the
dependents of Newport’s female employees enjoyed protection from
all categories of risk; in contrast, the female dependents of male
employees lacked protection for pregnancy related illness. 42 Because
Newport News had provided pregnancy disability insurance coverage
for its female employees, but not for the spouses of its male
employees, the company discriminated on the basis of pregnancy and
violated Title VII. 43
Unlike the benefits-received reasoning employed by the
Supreme Court in General Electric, the reasoning embraced in
Newport News is risk oriented. 44 In Newport News, the Supreme Court
recognized the General Electric dissenters’ interpretation of Title VII
as the approved Congressional interpretation. 45 Justice Brennan’s
General Electric dissent argued that a policy which specifically
excludes pregnancy related illness from a benefits package is facially
inference’ limiting the scope of the act to the specific problem that motivated its
enactment” and determined that the question of differential treatment of dependents
“should be resolved ‘on the basis of existing title VII principles.’” Id. at 680 (quoting
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 42-43 (Comm. Print 1980).
41
Id. at 683.
42
Id. at 684.
43
Id. The Supreme Court assumed only heterosexual couples exist, and noted,
“since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of the sex of the employee, it
follows inexorably that discrimination against female spouses in the provision of
fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employees.” Id. For a discussion
of access to reproductive technology and same-sex couples, see Judith F. Daar,
Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. OF GENDER, L. & JUST. 18 (2008).
44
Compare Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-139, with Newport News
462 U.S. at 678.
45
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678. The Newport court pointed to sections of
the Legislative History of the PDA which expressed Congress’s favor for the
reasoning and perception of the dissent. For example, the House Report stated, “It is
the Committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act.” Id.
The Senate Report also quoted from the dissenting justices’ opinions. Id.
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discriminatory. 46 Contrary to the majority’s perception of gender
neutral classifications based on pregnant and non-pregnant, Justice
Brennan asserted that any classification based on pregnancy must be
“at minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’” 47 But for pregnancy, argued
Justice Brennan, the plan “offers protection for all risks, even those
that are ‘unique to’ men or heavily male dominated.” 48 By excluding
pregnancy, a uniquely feminine condition, from coverage, the General
Electric disability program left a greater burden of risk upon the
female employees than it did upon the male. 49 Whereas men were
protected from all categories of risk to which they could be subjected,
women received only partial protection. 50
Adopting Justice Brennan’s analytical approach, the Newport
court analyzed the comprehensiveness of coverage offered to males
and females by evaluating the risks to which each gender remained
exposed. 51 Because the Newport plan refused coverage of pregnancy
related illness to female dependents of male employees, the Court
concluded that the plan “provide[d] more complete hospitalization
coverage for the spouses of female employees than it did for the
spouses of male employees,” 52 and therefore “unlawfully [gave]
married male employees a benefit package for their dependents that is
less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married
female employees.” 53
The Supreme Court’s decision in International Union is
equally important to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hall v. Nalco.
Unlike Newport and General Electric, International Union concerned
adverse employment actions perpetrated due to gender discrimination
46

Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 149.
48
Id. at 160.
49
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 677-678.
50
Id. at 678 (quoting Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 161-62 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
51
Id. at 683-684.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 684.
47
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rather than unequal terms of employment. 54 In International Union,
male and female employees of the battery manufacturer, Johnson
Controls, challenged the company’s fetal protection policy as a
violation of Title VII. 55 The fetal protection policy prohibited fertile
women from performing jobs involving lead exposure with the stated
goal of protecting the females’ unborn children. 56 Despite credible
scientific evidence demonstrating negative fetal effects due to the
father’s exposure to lead, Johnson Controls allowed fertile men to risk
their reproductive health. 57
The Supreme Court concluded, “Johnson Controls’ policy is
not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of
the company’s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of
the females.” 58 Because it treated the reproductive capacities of each
gender differently, the fetal protection policy could not be a
classification based on “fertility alone.” 59 Rather, the policy
discriminated based on fertility and on gender and childbearing
capacity. 60 By targeting female reproductive capacity in particular, the
policy discriminated on the basis of “potential for pregnancy,” and
could not be considered facially neutral. 61
In Newport and International Union, the Supreme Court began
the creation of an analytical and precedential framework to guide
lower courts in their interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. By repudiating the General Electric majority’s reasoning and by
embracing Justice Brennan’s analytical approach, the Supreme Court
has directed lower courts to focus on the risks to which gender
classification remain vulnerable when analyzing the neutrality of
employment benefits. In contrast, International Union creates
54

Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
Id.
56
Id. at 191-192.
57
Id. at 197-198.
58
Id. at 199.
59
Id. at 198.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 199.
55
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Supreme Court precedent suggesting that employers may differentiate
among employees according to fertility, so long as those
differentiations occur in a gender neutral manner.
III. THE BOUNCING BUNDLE OF JOY:
A NEW CLASS OF CLAIMS IN THE PDA FAMILY
In its recent decision, Hall v. Nalco, the Seventh Circuit
became the first Circuit Court of Appeals to recognize a cognizable
claim of Title VII sex discrimination where an employer allegedly
perpetrated an adverse employment action in response to an
employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments. More specifically, Ms.
Hall, the plaintiff in Hall, sought leave from her job in order to
undergo in vitro fertilization, a surgical impregnation procedure.
According to Ms. Hall’s allegations, her employer terminated her as a
result of her request for leave.
A. The Problem of Infertility
Infertility is a common problem that affects approximately
10% of all couples in the United States. 62 Within that 10% of infertile
couples, 40% of all cases are attributable to male infertility factors,
and a corresponding 40% of cases are attributable to female infertility
factors. 63 Doctors attribute the remaining 20% of cases to a
combination of male and female infertility issues. 64 According to the
medical community, infertility is “a disease or condition of the
reproductive system often diagnosed after a couple has had one year of
unprotected, well-timed intercourse, or if the woman has suffered from
multiple miscarriages.” 65 For couples who wish to conceive despite
62

Bradley J. Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 379, 379

(2007).
63

Bentley, supra note 10, at 394-395.
Id.
65
Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage
Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 297 (2004-2005).
64
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reduced fertility of either the male or female form, medical assistance
exists in the form of hormone treatments, prescription drugs, and
corrective surgeries such as the repair or removal of blockages from
fallopian tubes. 66
Eighty-five to ninety percent of infertility cases are able to
conceive using the treatments already described. 67 The remaining 10–
15 % of cases, however, may turn to more drastic measures such as
surgical impregnation procedures. 68 Surgical impregnation procedures
come in a variety of forms, including in vitro fertilization, Gamete
Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer
(ZIFT). 69 The procedures are defined by the manner in which
fertilization is attempted and the location in which implantation of the
fertilized egg occurs. 70 With in vitro fertilization, for instance, the
female’s eggs are surgically extracted and then fertilized by the male’s
sperm in a laboratory. 71 The embryos resulting from fertilization are
then placed in the female’s womb. 72 Many gender specific infertility
problems have prescribed treatments that must be performed on the
particular individual suffering from the problem. 73 Surgical
impregnation procedures, although performed only on women, can be
used to treat both male and female fertility. 74

66

Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 300.
68
Id.
69
Bentley, supra note 10, at 396.
70
Id.
71
MARK H. BEERS, MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 1418-1419
(2d Home ed., Pocket Books 2003).
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., Stuart S. Howards, Treatment of Male Infertility, 332 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 312, 313-316 (1998); Howard S. Jones & James P. Toner, The Infertile
Couple, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711-1712 (1993).
74
See Howards, supra note 73, at 313-316.
67
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B. Hall v. Nalco
Ms. Hall began working for Nalco in 1997, becoming a sales
secretary in 2000. 75 In March 2003, Ms. Hall requested a leave of
absence to undergo in vitro fertilization. 76 This leave was approved by
her direct supervisor and lasted from March 24 through April 21. 77
Unfortunately, Ms. Hall’s first attempt to become pregnant through
reproductive technology failed. 78 Upon returning to work, Ms. Hall
informed her supervisor that she would be requesting additional leave
in order to undergo the in vitro fertilization procedure again. 79
Beginning in January of 2003, several months prior to Ms.
Hall’s initial request for leave, Nalco began preparations for a
consolidation of its sales offices. 80 Sometime between that January
and July of 2003, Nalco determined that the consolidated sales offices
would require only one secretary. 81 Since each office had its own
secretary, one of them would have to be let go following completion
of the consolidation. 82 After Ms. Hall returned from her first leave and
requested additional leave to again attempt in vitro fertilization, Ms.
Hall was terminated. 83
In response to her termination, Ms. Hall brought a gender
discrimination claim under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, alleging that Nalco terminated her because of her
request for leave to undergo in vitro fertilization treatments. 84 To
demonstrate a causal link between her attempts to become pregnant
and her termination, Ms. Hall offered several statements from her
75

Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 646. (7th Cir. 2008)
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 645.
76
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supervisor, which asserted that the termination was in Ms. Hall’s “best
interest due to [her] health condition.” 85 In addition, Ms. Hall pointed
to notes regarding the content of a meeting between the supervisor and
the employee relations manager which specifically mentioned her
infertility treatments. 86 Specifically, the notes read, “missed a lot of
work due to health,” and, “absenteeism-infertility treatments.” 87
Without reaching the merits of Ms. Hall’s claim, the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment
for the defendant, Nalco. 88 Concluding that infertile women are not a
protected class under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 89 the District
Court held that Ms. Hall could not demonstrate sex discrimination
because infertility is a gender neutral condition. 90 Ms. Hall appealed
the District Court judgment, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating,
“Because adverse employment actions taken on account of
childbearing capacity affect only women, Hall has stated a cognizable
sex-discrimination claim under the language of the PDA.” 91
85

Id. at 646.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 645.
90
Id. In so holding, the District Court called two previous Northern District of
Illinois cases into question. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coll. and Univ. for
Northeastern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Both of these cases
involved female employees who utilized sick days or other leave in order to undergo
infertility treatments. In each case, the female was terminated and brought suit under
the PDA alleging that an adverse employment action had occurred. And in both
cases, the District Court found their claims cognizable, arguing that the PDA extends
protection to potential pregnancy. See Pacourek, 858 F.Supp. at 1401; Erickson, 911
F.Supp. at 319. The Court also argued that a female undergoing fertility treatments
should be included in the class of women who are potentially pregnant. Pacourek,
858 F.Supp. at 1403; Erickson, 911 F.Supp. at 320.
91
Hall, 534 F.3d at 645. Although Ms. Hall based her case on the argument that
infertile women are a protected class under the PDA, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
the case under the childbearing capacity/potential pregnancy legal theory. Id. at 649
n. 3.
86
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By so stating, the Seventh Circuit classified the pursuit of infertility
treatments as a medical condition related to pregnancy within the
meaning of the PDA and recognized an adverse employment action
based on an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments as a
cognizable claim Title VII claim. 92
IV. MAKING ROOM FOR THE NEW ARRIVAL: HALL V. NALCO AND
CONTEMPORARY PDA JURISPRUDENCE
Although likely to face a warm reception from champions of a
liberal interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 93
the Seventh Circuit’s decision to recognize pursuit of infertility
treatments as a medical condition related to pregnancy causes some
strain in the context of contemporary PDA jurisprudence. First, the
Seventh Circuit’s holding creates a possible conflict with the Second
and Eighth Circuits, both of which have previously refused to
recognize a cognizable claim arising from the exclusion of infertility
treatments from insurance coverage. 94 Second, in articulating and
justifying its decision, the Seventh Circuit created a murky distinction
between fertility related medical conditions, which do not give rise to
a cognizable claim under the PDA, and childbearing related medical
conditions, which can give rise to a cognizable claim under the PDA. 95
Despite the seeming obscurity of this distinction, Supreme Court
precedent, the legislative history of the PDA, and logic indicate that
92

Id. at 646.
See Pendo, supra note 65, at 343 (arguing that comprehensive insurance
coverage of infertility treatments would lead to better, more humane, and more costeffective treatments); Julie Manning Magid, Contraception and Contractions: A
Divergent Decade Following Johnson Controls, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 115, 142-144
(2003) (advocating a broad interpretation of the PDA). But see Katherine E. Abel,
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for Infertility
Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 849-850 (2005) (urging
a more complete understanding of the moral and legal implications of infertility
treatments before expanding PDA protection).
94
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa, 95
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
95
Hall, 534 F.3d at 647-648.
93
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the Seventh Circuit correctly determined that adverse employment
action based on an employee’s pursuit of infertility treatments is
cognizable gender discrimination under the PDA. To the extent that
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion is inconsistent with those of the Eighth
and Second Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has chosen the more logical
approach.
A. Establishing the New-Born Identity: The Distinction Between
Fertility and Childbearing Capacity
Given the express language of the PDA 96 and Supreme Court
precedent suggesting that infertility is a gender neutral characteristic
lacking protection under the PDA 97 , Ms. Hall’s claim does not
immediately appear as the ideal candidate for coverage under the
PDA. In the District Court, Hall alleged that she was “a member of a
protected class, female with a pregnancy related condition,
infertility.” 98 The District Court promptly dismissed her claim on
summary judgment, stating that infertile women are not a protected
class under the PDA because infertility is a gender neutral condition.99
Although accepting the Supreme Court’s implication that infertility
discrimination is not prohibited by the PDA, the Seventh Circuit
nevertheless found the District Court’s emphasis on “infertility alone”
was misplaced within the factual context of Ms. Hall’s claim. 100
According to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, Ms. Hall’s claim did not
allege infertility discrimination, but rather discrimination on the basis
of childbearing capacity, a gender-specific trait qualifying as a medical
96

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
98
Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 648. Despite the Supreme Court precedent provided by International
Union, commentators continue to argue that infertility should receive protection
under Title VII as amended by the PDA. See Pendo, supra note 65, at 336-338
(arguing that infertility is a gender-specific trait because it is still seen as a “woman’s
problem” and because infertility has a disproportionate psychological impact on
females).
97
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condition related to pregnancy under the PDA. 101 The Seventh Circuit
thereby reached two separate conclusions: 1) childbearing capacity is
separate and distinct from fertility, and 2) childbearing capacity is a
medical condition related to pregnancy and, therefore, a protected
classification under Title VII as amended by the PDA.
The distinction between childbearing capacity and fertility at
first appears murky. Fertile, in medical terminology, means “fruitful;
having the capacity to reproduce.” 102 Logically, a female who is
capable of reproducing, and who is therefore fertile, must be capable
of bearing a child. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit properly
recognized childbearing capacity as gender specific while continuing
to maintain the gender neutrality of infertility.
Although the Seventh Circuit referred to Newport News in
support of its recognition of the PDA as a Congressional overruling of
General Electric, 103 the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in support of the
distinction between childbearing capacity and fertility relied almost
exclusively on International Union. 104 The Seventh Circuit reiterated
the Supreme Court’s finding that a fetal protection policy which
classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity rather than
fertility alone violates Title VII. 105 According to the Seventh Circuit,
“As Johnson Controls illustrates, even where (in)fertility is at issue,
the employer conduct complained of must actually be gender neutral
to pass muster.” 106 An action undertaken by an employer based on an
employee’s childbearing capacity, however, can never be gender
neutral: the Seventh Circuit argued, “Employees terminated for taking
time off to undergo IVF—just like those terminated for taking time off
to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related case—will always be
101
102

Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-649.
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 684 (Elsevier, 30th ed.

2003).
103

Hall, 534 F.3d at 647 (citing Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676678 (1983)).
104
Id. at 648-649.
105
Id. at 648.
106
Id.
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women.” 107 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s distinction between
childbearing capacity and fertility is best understood as a reiteration of
the Supreme Court’s suggestion that an employer may differentiate
between employees on the basis of fertility, so long as the employer
does so in a gender neutral manner. Differentiation based on
employees’ childbearing capacity is differentiation based on fertility;
however differentiation based on childbearing capacity is not a gender
neutral differentiation based on fertility and it therefore violated Title
VII as amended by the PDA.
Having reached the logic behind the Seventh Circuit’s
differentiation between childbearing capacity and fertility, one must
still consider whether childbearing capacity is appropriately
considered a medical condition related to pregnancy. The PDA states,
“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions . . .” 108 The PDA does not define related
medical condition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s only guidance
appears by implication in International Union, where the Supreme
Court appeared to suggest that employment discrimination on the basis
of fertility is permissible under Title VII and the PDA so long as the
discrimination is truly gender neutral. 109 Clearly, there is a causal
chain between fertility treatments and pregnancy, but the Circuit
Courts of Appeal rather unanimously require more than a simple
causal chain to establish a medical condition related to pregnancy. 110
107

Id. at 648-649.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
109
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). The Second,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all appear to accept this implication as sound and
binding precedent. E.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003);
Hall, 534 F.3d at 638; Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
110
E.g. Fleming v. Ayers & Assoc.’s, 948 F.2d 993, 997 (6th Cir. 1991)
(medical related conditions under the PDA do not encompass adverse employment
actions based on the medical condition of the child simply because the condition is
present at birth); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to employer who terminated female
employee who arrived late due to morning sickness); In re Union Pac. R.R.
Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument
108
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The Eighth Circuit in particular has taken a conservative view
of what constitutes a medical condition related to pregnancy and
childbirth. 111 In International Union, the Supreme Court found sex
discrimination because the fetal protection policy was classified based
on childbearing capacity and potential for pregnancy. 112 Heedless of
the inclusion of “potential for pregnancy” within the PDA, the Eighth
Circuit refuses to extend PDA coverage to issues and conditions which
predate pregnancy. 113 If the Eighth Circuit clings to this line of
reasoning, it will likely refuse PDA protection for claims such as Ms.
Hall’s. But if the Eighth Circuit realizes the error of its approach, or at
least decides to temper that approach upon recalling the decision in
International Union, it should reach the same conclusion which the
Seventh Circuit reached in Hall.
Even if the Eighth Circuit wished to perpetuate its refusal to
class use of contraceptives as a medical condition related to
pregnancy, the Eighth Circuit could still reach the Seventh Circuit’s
holding that pursuit of surgical impregnation procedures is a medical
condition related to pregnancy in the context of adverse employment
actions. First, although the in vitro fertilization treatments received by
Ms. Hall necessarily occur prior to conception, just like the
contraceptives for which the plaintiffs sought insurance coverage in In
that causal chain between contraceptives and pregnancy entitled petitioner to Title
VII relief); McNill v. N. Y.C. Dept. of Correction, 950 F. Supp.564, 570-571
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (limiting “related medical conditions” to incapacitating conditions
in the mother for which medical care is usual and normal).
111
In re Union, 479 F.3d at 941. For a brief additional discussion of the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in In re Union, see Harvard Law Review Association,
Employment Law—Title VII—Eighth Circuit Holds That Benefits Plans Excluding
All Contraceptives Do Not Discriminate Based on Sex—In Re Union Pacific
Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2007), Reh’g and
Reg’g En Banc Denied, No. 06-1706 (8th Cir. May 23, 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV.
1447 (2008). For a discussion regarding insurance coverage of contraceptives
generally, see Pendo, supra note 65, at 293-343; Ernest F. Lidge III, An Employer’s
Exclusion of Coverage for Contraceptive Drugs is Not Per Se Sex Discrimination,
76 TEMP. L. REV. 533 (2003).
112
Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 198-199.
113
In re Union, 479 F.3d at 939.
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re Union, the treatments are conceptually different from
contraceptives. Second, in vitro fertilization and similar surgical
impregnation procedures are less open to characterization as genderneutral than is contraceptive use.
In addition to the temporal disconnection between
contraceptive use and pregnancy, the Eighth Circuit also identified a
conceptual dissonance between the issues, arguing, “Contraception is
not a medical treatment that occurs when or if a woman becomes
pregnant; instead contraception prevents pregnancy from even
occurring.” 114 In contrast, surgical impregnation procedures are
undertaken with the specific intent of instigating pregnancy rather than
preventing it. A woman who undergoes in vitro fertilization has a clear
intention of becoming pregnant. As a result, fertility treatments such as
in vitro fertilization are much more closely related to the concept of
potential pregnancy than are contraceptives.
In In re Union, the Eighth Circuit also asserted that
contraception, like infertility, is a gender-neutral term. 115 Men and
women do suffer equally from infertility, 116 and both men and women
may seek to avoid an unplanned pregnancy by utilizing contraceptives.
However, only women can undergo surgical impregnation procedures.
Therefore, as the Seventh Circuit noted, only women will ever request
leave of absence from their employer for the purpose of undergoing
infertility treatments of this type, and only women will be the subject
of adverse employment actions taken in response to those requests. 117
In any event, the Eighth Circuit’s stark refusal to consider prepregnancy conditions as potential medical conditions related to
114

Id. at 942.
Id. at 943. The dissent argues that contraception is far less gender-neutral
than the Eighth Circuit would claim and asserts that the burden of excluding any
contraceptive, including surgical forms performed only on men, falls on women
because women remain the sole gender capable of becoming pregnant. Id. at 945
(Bye, J. dissenting).
116
James F. Donovan & Jay I. Sandlow, The Infertile Couple, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1154, 1154 (1994) (stating that male infertility is a primary or secondary factor
in fifty percent of infertile couples)
117
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648-649 (7th Cir. 2008).
115
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pregnancy is inappropriate in light of both the Supreme Court
precedent already cited and the legislative history of the PDA. The
PDA was drafted and passed in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in General Electric, and for the stated purpose of countering
the societal perspective of women as temporary members of the
workforce who would cease working as soon as pregnancy and a
family occurred. 118 This perception affected not only pregnant women
but every woman perceived by her employer as potentially
pregnant. 119 Employers hesitated to advance women to positions and
salaries of importance due to the belief that the women would not be
in the workplace for more than a few years. 120 Recognizing this
prevalent societal view, the enacting Congress understood that
forbidding an employer to discriminate against pregnant women is a
useless stopgap if the employer remains free to discriminate against
women who the employer knows or suspects to be attempting to
become pregnant. 121
If, based on logic, legislative history, and Supreme Court
precedent, it is essential to include potentially pregnant women within
the protection of the PDA, it makes no sense to distinguish between
potentially pregnant women based on whether they intend to become
pregnant through natural means or with the assistance of reproductive
technology. Given the legislative history and purpose surrounding the
PDA and the Supreme Court’s recognition of PDA coverage of
potential pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit created a valid distinction
between childbearing capacity and fertility and correctly classified
childbearing capacity as a medical condition related to pregnancy.

118

Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 3 (Comm. Print 1980).
119
Id. at 62.
120
Id. at 3.
121
Id. at 62-63.
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B. Keeping Peace Between the Siblings: Distinguishing Hall from
Saks and Krauel
Although the Seventh Circuit is the first Circuit Court of
Appeals to recognize a cognizable claim where an adverse
employment action arises from a woman’s pursuit of surgical
impregnation procedures, two other Circuit Courts have considered a
closely related issue: whether gender discrimination occurs where an
employer excludes insurance coverage for surgical impregnation
procedures. 122 Neither the Eighth Circuit, which considered the
question in Krauel v. Iowa, nor the Second Circuit, which faced the
issue in Saks v. Franklin Covey, extended the protection of the PDA to
women undergoing the procedures. 123 As the Seventh Circuit points
out, neither the Eighth nor the Second Circuits considered the precise
question at issue in Hall. 124 Furthermore, to the extent that the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion is inconsistent with those of the Eighth and Second
Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has chosen the more logical approach.
In Krauel, the Eighth Circuit considered the PDA claim of a
female respiratory therapist who had been denied coverage under her
company plan for a surgical impregnation procedure. 125 The insurance
policy in question excluded not just treatment of female infertility
problems but treatment of male infertility as well.126 The Eighth
Circuit construed the terms of the PDA narrowly, determining that the
general term “related medical condition” should be understood as
referring to the specific terms of pregnancy and childbirth and should
not be extended outside of those contexts. 127 Based on this restrictive
122

Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa,
95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
123
Saks, 316 F.3d at 345; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679.
124
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008).
125
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 675. Specifically, Ms. Krauel underwent GIFT, a
surgical infertility treatment procedure in which the ova and sperm are mixed in a
Petri dish. The mixture is then inserted in the fallopian tube to allow natural
fertilization to occur. Id. at 676, 676 n.3.
126
Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1996).
127
Id. at 679.

139
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

23

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

interpretation of “related medical conditions,” the Eighth Circuit found
fertility treatments to be too temporally and conceptually disconnected
from pregnancy and childbirth to be a cognizable claim under the
PDA; the Court argued, “[p]regnancy and childbirth, which occur after
conception, are strikingly different from infertility, which prevents
conception.” 128
Similarly, in Saks, the Second Circuit addressed the gender
discrimination claim of a female employee who had been denied
insurance coverage for a surgical impregnation procedure. 129 Unlike
the policy at issue in Krauel, however, the policy which denied the
Ms. Saks coverage did cover some fertility treatments. Ovulation kits,
oral fertility drugs, medically-necessary penile prosthetic implants,
and nearly all surgical infertility treatments other than surgical
impregnation procedures received insurance coverage. 130 The policy
expressly excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures,
including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), and
embryo and fetal implantation. 131 Ms. Saks was denied coverage for
an IVF attempt and related prescription drug therapy. 132 At the Second
Circuit, Ms. Saks argued that the insurance plan violated the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act by providing less comprehensive
coverage for surgical treatments addressing female infertility than it
provided for non-pregnancy related illness. 133 Although recognizing

128

Id.
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003).
130
Id. Specifically, the plan covered surgical procedures including those to
remedy variococeles (varicose veins in the testicles leading to low sperm count),
blockages of the vas deferens (also a procedure performed on males), endometriosis,
and tubal occlusions. Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 342. Saks also raised a Title VII argument, alleging that the plan
violated Title VII by providing “incomplete coverage for surgical treatments for
female infertility but. . .complete coverage for surgical procedures remedying male
infertility.” Id.
129
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that the PDA “clearly embraces more than pregnancy itself,” 134 the
Second Circuit rejected Saks’ argument, stating:
Including infertility within the PDA’s protection as a “related
medical condition[]” would result in the anomaly of defining a
class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes
and yet is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination…[W]e
hold that infertility standing alone does not fall within the
meaning of the phrase “related medical conditions” under the
PDA. 135
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit differentiated its
case from International Union. According to the Second Circuit’s
reasoning, unlike the fetal protection policy in International Union,
the Franklin Covey insurance plan achieved a gender neutral
discrimination based on fertility alone. 136 Even though the Franklin
Covey insurance plan covered all surgical infertility treatments
performed on males but only some of those performed on females, the
Second Circuit found the plan to be gender neutral because the
excluded surgical impregnation procedures may treat either male or
female infertility. 137 The Second Circuit concluded, ““[B]ecause the
exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures disadvantages infertile
male and female employees equally, Saks’s claim does not fall within
the purview of the PDA.” 138
Despite the seeming inconsistency between the Eighth and
Second Circuits and the Seventh Circuit, Hall confronts the decisions
of the Eighth and Second Circuits peripherally and brushes them aside
casually. 139 The Seventh Circuit found little fault with Saks and
Krauel. Indeed, the courts reached several common conclusions. The
134

Id. at 343.
Id. at 346.
136
Id.; See also Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
137
Saks, 316 F.3d at 347.
138
Id. at 346.
139
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008)..
135
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Seventh Circuit accepts the Eighth and Second Circuit’s assertions that
classifications based on fertility alone are gender neutral and therefore
beyond the reach of the PDA. 140 In fact, the Seventh Circuit even cites
favorably to some of the core reasoning of Saks, noting the logic
behind the Second Circuit’s contention that the PDA cannot extend
protection to a classification simultaneously including equal numbers
of both genders and remaining vulnerable to gender discrimination. 141
The questions considered by the three courts are similar in a general
sense—all three questions considered whether a woman alleging
discrimination based on her pursuit of infertility treatments states a
cognizable claim under the PDA. 142 Furthermore the Seventh Circuit
appears to reach a result that is diametrically opposed to those of the
Eighth and Second Circuits: the Seventh Circuit finds the claim
cognizable, while the Second and Eighth Circuits refuse to do so. 143
Yet, the Seventh Circuit directly conflicts with the Eighth and Second
Circuits on only two points: the application of the PDA to potential
pregnancy and the application of International Union v. Johnson
Controls to the facts of the case.
On the question of the application of the PDA to potential
pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit explicitly disagrees with the Eighth
Circuit. 144 With respect to this issue, the Eighth Circuit asserted that
the PDA applies only after conception. 145 The Second Circuit reserved
140

Id.
Id.
142
Saks, 316 F.3d at 340-41; Hall, 534 F.3d at 645; Krauel v. Iowa, 95 F.3d
674, 675-676 (8th Cir. 1996).
143
Saks, 316 F.3d at 346; Hall, 534 F.3d at 649; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-680.
144
Hall, 534 F.3d at 648, n. 1.
145
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. This aspect of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
became an integral part of that court’s ruling in In re Union, where the Eighth
Circuit refused to require insurance coverage of contraceptives. In re Union Pac.
R.R. Prac. Lit. 479 F. 3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007). Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit’s
assertion is at odds with its own case law. In Walsh v. National Computer Systems,
Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit upheld a jury verdict
awarded in response to a PDA claim brought by a woman who was “discriminated
against. . .because she is a woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity
141
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judgment on the issue. 146 The Seventh Circuit however, stated, “[T]his
argument . . . is specifically foreclosed by Johnson Controls, which
explicitly recognized the applicability of the PDA to classifications
based on “potential for pregnancy,” not just actual pregnancy.” 147 In
this respect, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is irreconcilable with the
Eighth Circuit’s. 148 However, the holdings of the two cases may still
be distinguishable. Because the insurance plan at issue in Krauel
excluded coverage for all infertility treatments, 149 the Eighth Circuit
could have decided the question by simply terming the exclusion a
gender-neutral differentiation based on fertility. 150
The Seventh Circuit also diverges from the Eighth and Second
at the point that those two Circuits begin to differentiate their facts
from those of International Union. After noting that the International
Union decision implicitly allows discrimination based on fertility
under the PDA, 151 the Eighth and Second Circuits take distinctive
approaches to distinguishing International Union. 152 The Eighth
Circuit points out that the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures in its case, unlike the fetal protection policy in
International Union truly achieved gender neutrality—the policy
refused to cover any infertility treatments, whether designed to treat

leave, and might become pregnant again.” At the time of the litigation, however, the
women had not yet become pregnant. Id.
146
Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. By expressly declining to consider whether an
infertile female employee could state a claim under the PDA for an adverse
employment action, the Second Circuit also declined to assert that potential
pregnancy could never give rise to a cognizable PDA claim. Id.
147
Hall, 534 F.3d. at 648, n.1.
148
Id. The Seventh Circuit specifically refers to this aspect of the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning as “foreclosed by Johnson Controls.” Id. For additional
discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Krauel, 95 F.3d at 674.
149
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678.
150
See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
151
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-680.
152
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 345-346 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel, 95
F.3d at 680.
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males or females and no matter what caused the infertility. 153 The
Second Circuit had a slightly more difficult time. The policy at issue
in Saks, after all, did provide coverage for some infertility treatments.
The Second Circuit concluded, however, that the employer’s insurance
policy achieved gender neutrality by refusing to cover surgical
impregnation procedures whether the procedure was used to treat male
or female infertility. 154
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined that Hall mirrored
the circumstances of International Union, 155 employing the case in
support of its argument that the PDA applies to potential pregnancy in
general and to adverse employment actions arising from the pursuit of
surgical impregnation procedures specifically. 156 This inconsistency
between the three cases creates two possibilities: either (1) either the
Seventh Circuit or the Eighth and Second Circuits are incorrect, or (2)
all three Circuits are correct and it is appropriate to view the pursuit of
surgical impregnation procedures as a medical condition related to
pregnancy in the context of adverse employment action while not
conferring the same status in the context of insurance coverage.
The Seventh Circuit observed no inconsistency in viewing an
adverse employment action perpetrated due to an employee’s decision
to undergo in vitro fertilization as a violation of Title VII as amended
by the PDA, while simultaneously maintaining that there is no
cognizable claim under the PDA against an employer who refuses to
provide insurance coverage for surgical impregnation procedures. 157
The Seventh Circuit viewed the question addressed to it as
fundamentally different from the question considered by the Eighth
and Second Circuit. 158
The PDA, however, applies equally to discrimination in the
form of adverse employment action and discrimination in the form of
153

Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
Saks, 316 F.3d at 347.
155
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 647-648 (7th Cir. 2008).
156
Id. at 648.
157
Id. at 647-648.
158
Id. at 646.
154
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unequal benefits or dissimilar access to fringe benefit programs. 159 In
relevant part, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act states,
[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected by similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h)
of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 160
The Act makes no distinction between discrimination through adverse
employment action and discrimination through unequal provision of
employment benefits. With respect to both adverse employment
actions and benefits, discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions,” is prohibited. 161 Neither
does the PDA provide any distinction between “related medical
conditions” in the adverse employment action and “related medical
conditions” in the benefits contexts. 162
Although the plain language of the PDA makes no distinction
between the benefits and the adverse employment action contexts,
infertility treatments would not be the first characteristic to be treated
differently with respect to insurance coverage and adverse
employment actions. Abortion is specifically exempted from the
medical conditions for which an employer must provide medical
insurance benefits. 163 The PDA includes a provision reading,
This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health
insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term,

159

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
160
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or except where medical complications have arisen from an
abortion. 164
The Act makes no statement regarding the scope of protection offered
to adverse employment actions perpetrated on the basis of an
employee’s decision to receive an abortion. 165 However, the Third
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have both concluded that adverse
employment actions taken in response to an employee’s intent or
decision to receive an abortion does give rise to a cognizable claim
under the PDA. 166
Both Circuits supported their decisions with legislative history,
and EEOC Guidelines. The Legislative History of the PDA provides:
Because [the PDA] applies to all situations in which women
are “affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions,” its basic language covers women who chose to
terminate their pregnancies. This no employer may, for
example, fire or refuse to hire a woman simply because she has
exercised her right to have an abortion. 167
In addition, the House Conference Report on the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act suggests that women who chose to terminate a
pregnancy are protected by the PDA. The Report states, “[N]o
employer may, for example, fire or refuse to hire a woman simply
because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.” 168 Finally,
the Third and Sixth Circuits relied on EEOC Guidelines promulgated
in 1986. Those Guidelines indicate that abortion is a medical condition

164

Id.
Id.
166
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008); Turic v.
Holland Hosp., 85 F. 3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
167
Turic, 85 F.3d at 1214 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1786, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. pp. 4749, 4765-66.)
168
H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1786 (Oct. 13, 1978).
165
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related to pregnancy in the limited context of adverse employment
actions:
The basic principle of the [PDA] is that women affected by
pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as
other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work. A woman is therefore protected against such
practices as being fired…merely because she is pregnant or has
had an abortion. 169
The very specific discussion of abortion in the legislative history of
the PDA and in the EEOC Guidelines provides an indication of
Congressional intent on the issue.
Given the unique treatment of abortion, it is not inconceivable
that an employee’s pursuit of surgical impregnation would or would
not give rise to a cognizable claim depending on the type of unequal
treatment giving rise to claim. But abortion is accorded unique
treatment precisely because it is a unique issue in the PDA context.
Proponents of the PDA abortion exclusion provision strongly felt that
“employers who are opposed to abortion should not be forced to, in
effect, violate their personal moral conscience by financing payments
for abortion.” 170 Contemporary moral attitudes toward the use of
infertility treatments would not seem to justify a specific exclusion for
insurance coverage for surgical impregnation procedures.171 Although
the specific language of the Act does not support the anomalous
treatment of abortion, there is strong support in the legislative history
of the PDA for doing so. 172 There is no similar expression of
Congressional intent with respect to surgical impregnation procedures,
169

Turic, 85 F.3d at 1213 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1986)).
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Legislative History
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 113 (Comm. Print 1980)
171
But see Abel, supra note 93, at 849-850 (urging a more complete
understanding of the moral and legal implications of infertility treatments before
expanding PDA protection).
172
See supra text accompanying notes 167-168.
170
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which were not widely available in 1978 when Congress enacted the
PDA. 173
Nevertheless, there is a logical distinction between infertility
treatments in the context of insurance coverage and in the context of
adverse employment action. The distinction relies upon the Seventh
Circuit’s differentiation between childbearing capacity and fertility
and is supported by the Supreme Court’s International Union. As the
Supreme Court noted in City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, in the context of insurance benefits, “[t]reating different
classes of risks as though they were the same for purposes of group
insurance is a common practice that has never been considered
inherently unfair.” 174 So long as the insurance classification does not
treat any person “in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be
different,” there is no Title VII sex discrimination claim. 175 An
illustration of this reasoning occurs where an employer creates gender
neutral distinctions between fertile and infertile individuals. 176 So long
as the distinction is truly gender neutral, the employer’s refusal to
provide insurance coverage for infertility treatments can apply to men
and women equally. 177 In this circumstance, a woman may be
potentially pregnant, but there is no differentiation on that basis. The
class who suffers from the denial of fertility treatment insurance
coverage includes men who are unable to father children as a result of
their own infertility. 178 Furthermore, consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Newport News, both the male and female
employees bear the risk of their own infertility, and neither gender is
173

Van Voorhis, supra note 62, at 379 (noting the inception of IVF procedures
in 1978 and its remarkable increase in use since).
174
City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710
(1978).
175
Id. at 711.
176
See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
177
Bentley, supra note 10, at 394 (stating that statistically, 40% of all
infertility cases are attributable to a female factor with a corresponding 40% of cases
attributable to a male factor. The remaining 20% of infertility cases are attributable
to a combination of male and female factors.)
178
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
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treated more favorably than another. 179 Therefore, the exclusion of
surgical impregnation procedures from insurance coverage can be
gender neutral, depending on the accompanying provisions of the
policy. 180
In addition, there may be good policy reason for excluding
insurance coverage for infertility procedures. The cost of a single in
vitro fertilization cycle runs from $7,000 to $10,000. 181 Some
estimates suggest that including coverage of fertility treatments in
group health plans could increase the cost of these plans by as much as
3-5%. 182 Other sources argue that the estimated cost of comprehensive
infertility treatment coverage is overstated and may amount to as little
as $3.14 per employee, per year. 183 In the past, the Supreme Court has
been wary of allowing cost justifications to justify gender
discrimination. For instance, in International Union, the Supreme
Court refused to allow the increased cost associated with hiring
members of a particular sex to justify gender discrimination. 184
However, the Supreme Court has not entirely foreclosed the possibility
that financial concerns may be a weighty policy issue. In International
Union, the Supreme Court carefully emphasized,
We, of course, are not presented with, nor do we decide, a case in
which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of
179

Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). This approach raises
the challenge, however, of ensuring that employer benefits plans are gender neutral
both facially and in effect. For an argument that the Second Circuit wrongly
determined that the Franklin Covey insurance plan avoided gender discrimination
and that coverage exclusion of infertility treatments disparately impacts women, see
Pendo, supra note 65, at 336-340.
180
Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
181
Tarun Jain, Bernard L. Harlow, & Mark D. Hornstein,, Insurance Coverage
and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2002).
182
Insure.com, Paying the Price for Infertility,
http://www.insure.com/articles/healthinsurance/infertility-price.html (last visited
Dec. 11, 2008).
183
Pendo, supra note 65, at 341.
184
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210-11 (1991).
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the employer’s business. We merely reiterate our prior holding
that the incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify
discriminating against them. 185
If the costs of providing infertility treatments such as surgical
impregnation procedures prove to be so costly as to force businesses to
close their doors, the Supreme Court could determine that policy
concerns excuse unequal treatment in this regard.
In contrast, adverse employment action due to an employee’s
intent to undergo surgical impregnations procedures cannot claim the
same gender neutrality. 186 Males may participate in the procedure by
providing sperm, and male infertility may cause the need for the
procedure, 187 but only the female can undergo the procedure and only
the female will bear the risk of adverse employment action arising
from absences from work. 188 As a result, “Employees terminated for
taking time off to undergo IVF—just like those terminated for taking
time off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care—will
always be women.” 189 As a result, the class is no longer gender
neutral, and the woman who experiences an adverse employment
action as the result of taking time off to undergo fertility treatments
can state a cognizable claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
although a woman who is denied insurance coverage for the same
treatment may not have a claim. 190
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s novel decision in Hall v. Nalco, though
employing a murky distinction between childbearing capacity and
infertility and seeming to contradict the decisions of the Eighth and
185

Id.
Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
187
Bentley, supra note 10, at 397.
188
Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-649.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 649.
186
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Second Circuits, is nonetheless correct in its determination that an
employee who is terminated for taking time off to undergo in vitro
fertilization treatments states a cognizable claim under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. The holding neither requires employers to begin
providing insurance coverage for infertility treatments nor to provide
special accommodations to women attempting to become pregnant
through reproductive technology. 191 The decision simply requires an
employer to treat absence resulting from infertility treatments like any
other non-occupational disability for sake of hirings, firings, and other
employment actions.

191

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not require employers to make it
easier for women to work. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 286-287 (1987). Rather, the PDA simply requires employers to treat pregnant
and potentially pregnant workers in the same manner that they treat “similarly
affected but non-pregnant workers.” Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734,
738 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 83
(Comm. Print 1980) (“The touchstone of compliance is equality of treatment, and
any policy which affects pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions must apply
equally to other types of disabling conditions as well.”) But see Daniela M. de la
Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights
that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2008)
(arguing that employees experiencing pregnancy-related limitations should not be
denied accommodations due to pregnancy-blind policies).
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